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Between co-option and radical opposition: a comparative analysis of power-
sharing on gender equality and LGBTQ rights in Northern Ireland and Lebanon 
 
Scholars and policymakers debate whether “consociational institutions offer a viable 
strategy to build peace, states, and democracy”1 or if they aggravate “the malady it is 
allegedly designed to treat.” 2  Yet while these discussions focus on 
consociationalism’s consequences for the salient ethnic groups, its efficacy as a 
template for peace and security requires a more holistic assessment of its benefits for 
all citizens of the divided society regardless of the identity groups they belong to. 
Following on, a key research question is what are the implications of 
consociationalism for social groups – such as feminists, socialists, migrants, sexual 
minorities – whose primary political identities do not align with the societal cleavages 
that consociations primarily accommodate?  
 While it was once claimed that “ethnic conflict scholars have yet to adequately 
theorize the gendered implications of power-sharing arrangements,”3 a small body of 
researchers argue that consociationalism is largely deleterious for the progress of 
gender equality.4 This research tends to focus on single case studies thereby limiting 
the potential to draw wider conclusions. Little research, however, considers the 
relationship between consociationalism and Lesbian Gay Bisexual Transgender 
(LGBTQ) rights.5 This omission is surprising in light of work that demonstrates the 
specific ways homophobia has become major expressions of societal hate in some 
post-conflict societies.6 
 Towards addressing these gaps, we examine the implications of 
consociationalism on both gender equality and LGBTQ rights. More specifically, we 
 2 
ask whether power-sharing structures impact comparably or differently on issues 
gender and sexual issues. This question is important given how scholars have 
identified divergent ways in which gender and sexuality are situated within 
ethnonationalism. While women’s roles in ethnonationalist projects are often exalted 
as biological producers of members of ethnic collectivities, sexuality – especially 
lesbianism and homosexuality – is cast outside of the bounds of the pure ethnie. In 
addition, in order to capture the complex ways in which power-sharing impacts upon 
gender and sexuality, it is necessary to recognize that consociations vary in the extent 
to which they accommodate ethnicity and ethnonationalism. Towards this, we 
compare Northern Ireland and Lebanon since they represent contrasting examples of 
two types of consociational structures, corporate (Lebanon) and liberal (Northern 
Ireland) central to current debates on power-sharing.7 Given that corporate forms de 
facto exclude non-ethnic interests and liberal forms afford opportunities for the 
inclusion of non-ethnic interests, scholars expect that the liberal variant leads to much 
more positive outcomes for gender equality and rights for sexual minorities. 
 We argue, however, that liberal and corporate consociations generate complex 
but contrasting consequences for gender and LGBTQ rights. While liberal systems 
appear advantageous compared to corporate ones by encouraging access for non-
sectarian groups, in the long-term they can generate negative dynamics as the 
institutions seek to maintain stability by strengthening the rights of the adversarial 
ethnic groups and, in consequence, regressing rights for groups advancing issues that 
transcend ethnic cleavages. Moreover, since group rights represent a strategic site of 
political contestation between ethnic groups, minority rights can become embroiled 
within this wider conflict. Notably, however, we note that while LGBT rights can 
become co-opted as an issue within power-sharing, this does not occur in regards to 
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important claims for women, especially reproductive rights. This situation 
demonstrates the limits to which gender rights can be accommodated within 
ethnonationalist movements and consociational systems more broadly. Corporate 
systems, alternatively, by aiming to freeze the balance of power between the ethnic 
groups, completely exclude non-ethnic groups and rights and are even used by ethnic 
hardliners to deem non-sectarian groups as a threat to the integrity of power-sharing 
and security. These distinctions also shape differences in non-sectarian rights 
activism. Non-sectarian movements in liberal systems mobilize for inclusion within 
the system but can become easily sidelined in a framework infected by ethnic 
outbidding. In corporate frameworks, however, gender based and sexual minority 
movements tend to see the sectarian system as profoundly patriarchal and 
heteronormative, and thus as a site that stimulates radical opposition. 
 Given the lack of research that seeks to integrate an analysis of the 
consequences of power-sharing on both gender and sexuality, and in light of space 
limitations, this paper principally about attempting to set an agenda for future possible 
research, rather than being able to offer much substantive inquiry on its own terms. 
Thus, the analysis of the two case studies – Northern Ireland and Lebanon – is 
designed to provide a level of description to help illuminate some of the complex 
dynamics at work. 
 
Power-Sharing, Gender Equality and LGBTQ Rights 
While consociational power-sharing was once a system to manage linguistic, religious 
and even ideological cleavages, it has now become a key tool for ending violent 
intrastate conflicts over ethnonational self-determination. Consociationalism 
supposedly does this by accommodating the respective ethnonationalist identities 
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within the state. In so doing a key question is what happens to non-nationalist 
interests. Indeed, as Mann notes, ethnonationalism is at its strongest when it captures 
a range of inequalities, including gender and sexuality.8 Yet, while this may be true, it 
is also the case that gender and sexuality are differently positioned within 
ethnonationalist projects. In particular, women’s responsibilities in ethnonationalist 
movements, inter alia, fundamentally rest on their capacity to be biological 
reproducers of members of the nation. In being assigned this identity, the control of 
women’s sexuality derives vital importance to ethnonational projects. As noted by 
Albanese (2004: 12), under nationalist regimes, women’s reproductive rights and 
health are jeopardized to ensure the good health of the nation. The nationalist 
valorization of motherhood, most notably, often results in norms and policies that 
simultaneously rewards reproduction and penalizes non-reproductive women, ranging 
from the “restriction of contraceptive knowledge and techniques, denial of abortions, 
and provision of material rewards for bearing children.”9 For nationalist movements, 
women’s access to abortion is framed, in some instances, as analogous to treason and 
race suicide.10 Moreover, by linking female fecundity to the survival of the ethnic 
group, “deviant” female sexuality, such as lesbianism, is presented an extreme danger 
to the survival of the nation.11       
 While scholars and policymakers – as this special edition highlights – 
recognize the profoundly gendered impacts of contemporary civil war and peace 
processes, these effects are rarely considered in relation to LGBTQ populations. Yet 
sexual minorities are specifically targeted during conflict. The harrowing plight of 
Syria’s LGBTQ members during the civil war is well documented by human rights 
groups. “Corrective violence” or social cleansing featured as a strategy against 
Colombian sexual minorities deemed as failing to conform to traditional gender 
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stereotypes during the civil war. 12  Although there are not any power-sharing 
arrangements that specifically reserve a quota of positions for sexual minorities, a 
small number of peace pacts outline safeguards, including South Africa, Nepal, 
Northern Ireland and Colombia.13 Such safeguards, however, are rare. This omission 
is significant given that a small body of research demonstrates how anti-LGBTQ 
violence is common to societies emerging from protracted conflict. 14  Examples, 
which range from the use of corrective rape against lesbians in post-apartheid South 
Africa to the targeting of gay and lesbian people in post-Agreement Northern Ireland, 
attest to the endemic use of violence against sexual minorities within transitional 
societies.15  
 The assumption that ethnonationalist movements are intrinsically opposed to 
LGBT and women’s rights, however, is somewhat overstated. Ethnic nationalist 
movements have also co-opted the discourse of a pro-female agenda and LGBT 
rights, albeit as a tool to promote their putative liberal and progressive values in 
distinction to their rivals who are framed as backward and conservative. This 
ethnopolitics is notably apparent in contemporary movements who seize women’s and 
LGBT rights to target Muslim communities thus rendered in such discourses as 
incompatible with western liberal democratic principles such as tolerance.  
 Yet, crucially, there are limits to this appropriation, especially when 
reproductive rights feature. Ethnonationalist movements, rather than co-opting 
women’s rights by supporting reproductive rights, are much more likely to instigate 
policies to prohibit abortion as a mortal threat to the health and survival of the nation. 
Moreover, this intractable resistance to reproductive rights cannot be purely explained 
as fundamentally due to the often religious leanings of ethnonationalist projects. As 
Albanese argues, religious and nationalist opposition to abortion stem from different 
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logics, which nevertheless can intersect within the same movement. While religious 
conservatives condemn abortion on the basis of the right to life of the foetus, 
ethnonationalists structure their opposition to abortion due to the nation’s need to 
proliferate. Moreover, while anti-abortion views of religious conservatives remain 
constant, the actual or attempted regression of reproductive rights often accompanies 
the rise of ethnonationalist movements into power.  
  
Liberal and Corporate Power-sharing 
Rather than frame power-sharing as expediting a uniform set of negative 
consequences for gender equality and LGBTQ rights, the situation is more complex 
since power-sharing systems vary in recognizing and accommodating gender and 
sexuality rights. These dynamics are further compounded by differences between 
consociations in determining the strength of ethnicity in public institutions and the 
power of hardline ethnonationalist groupings. These variations may be crucial in 
generating important distinctions regarding gender equality and LGBTQ rights as 
well as the forms of mobilization and contestation created by feminist and sexual 
minority activists.  
 Given the unruly universe of consociational structures, a more focussed lens to 
examine gender and sexual minorities vis-à-vis power-sharing is to consider two types 
of consociational structures: “liberal” and “corporate.” Liberal and corporate 
consociations are distinguished between those that pre-determine ethnic 
representation in political and public institutions, mainly though constitutionally 
specified fixed quotas, and those that permit inclusion in such institutions to be self-
determined as a result of electoral performance or through group rights.16 Corporate 
consociations threaten to “further entrench and institutionalise … ethnic identities.”17 
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Liberal, self-determined consociations, alternatively, reward “whatever salient 
political identities emerge in democratic elections, whether these are based on ethnic 
groups, or on … trans-group identities.”18  
 These differences are crucial since a number of scholars and policymakers 
advocate liberal rather than corporate consociations. These distinctions require 
analysis vis-à-vis their effects on gender equality and LGBTQ rights, especially since 
liberal forms should, in principle, have much more positive outcomes due to how they 
are open to recognizing and even accommodating non-ethnic interests and rights. 
Corporate consociations represent closed systems as their main objective is to free in 
aspic the balance of power between the main ethnic groups. In so doing, corporate 
consociations purposely exclude non-ethnic actors since they are deemed a threat to 
the equilibrium assumed needed to maintain peace. Liberal consociations, 
alternatively, are theoretically relatively more open systems for the inclusion of 
groups that advance political programmes bridging the dominant ethnic cleavage. In 
consequence, the two types of consociations expedite contrasting constraints and 
opportunities for non-sectarian groups. While corporate consociations profoundly 
constrain the capability of non-sectarian movements to demand equality and rights 
within power-sharing institutions, the liberal form grants limited opportunities for 
such claims by cross-cleavage movements. These differences – between liberal and 
corporate forms – can be illuminated by examining further the case-studies of 
Northern Ireland and Lebanon. 
 
Northern Ireland 
Northern Ireland’s power-sharing institutions were crafted as part of the 1998 Good 
Friday peace agreement which aimed to end the conflict which resulted in 3,700 
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deaths. A consociational framework was utilized for Northern Ireland to reflect the 
diagnosis of the conflict as firmly rooted in ethnonationalism: a conflict of competing 
claims of national self-determination between Irish nationalists and Ulster unionists. 
On this basis power-sharing institutionalized “parity of esteem”: the principle that the 
rights and identities of Irish nationalists and Ulster unionists require equal 
recognition.19 
 Northern Ireland’s consociational government is identified as largely, though 
not exclusively, as conforming to the liberal self-determined mode: there are no seats 
or political positions reserved for specific ethnonational groups and executive places 
are distributed among parties based on their electoral performance.20 The devolved 
parliament, the Northern Ireland Assembly is led at the executive level by a 
premiership dyarchy chosen from the largest two parties, and a number of cabinet 
portfolios selected by the d’Hondt algorithm on the basis of the seats won by political 
parties. While seats and positions are not pre-determined for the ethnonational groups, 
aspects of the power-sharing system operate to guarantee nationalist and unionist 
representation, chiefly the use of nationalist and unionist mutual veto power, which is 
a proxy for pre-determined guarantees.21 
 
Lebanon 
Lebanon’s civil war, which began in 1975 and ended in 1990, led to an estimated 
144,000 deaths. While a simplistic reading of the civil war presents it as a 
Christian/Muslim conflict, it was extremely complex and included interventions by 
Syria and Israel, and a role for the Palestinian Liberation Army. The Ta’if Agreement 
(1989), a peace accord to end the civil war, restored consociationalism to Lebanon by 
constructing formula that created parity in representation between Christian and 
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Muslim sects.22 The Agreement’s tenet – “no victor, no vanquished” – signifies that 
no group dominates the power-sharing institutions at the expense of any other ethnic 
group in what is called a “covenant of mutual coexistence.” 
 Lebanon’s consociationalism – called “political sectarianism” in Lebanon – 
fortifies ethnic divisions through the idea of the allotment state (“muhasasa”), which 
guarantees representation for the main groups via a quota system or by reserving 
positions to specific groups.23 Thus, executive power is separated in a troika between 
the three largest groups, while the quota system is applied to the cabinet and to 
parliamentary seats on a 50/50 Christian/Muslim basis, which is reproduced 
throughout the public sector. To maintain the balance of power, group veto is 
embedded into the architecture of power-sharing since a two-thirds majority is 
required for important issues decided by the cabinet. Finally, under the terms of 
segmental autonomy, the constitution devolves legal authority to the religious leaders 
of the groups over a range of personal matters, including marriage, divorce and child 
custody rights.24 It is thus fair to say that Lebanon’s consociational scaffold permits 
little encouragement for individuals to look outside of the ethnic communities they 
are institutionally categorized as belonging to. 
 
Northern Ireland: Women and Sexual Minorities 
Women 
Northern Irish women figure as marginal figures in representative politics. Only 16 
women were elected to the various iterations of Northern Ireland’s legislative bodies 
from 1921 to 1986. 25  Within political parties, “women’s participation remained 
auxiliary to that of men” and women’s political activities were relegated to civic 
society, such as charitable and church-related groups.26 Despite their omission from 
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formal politics, many Northern Irish women organized as feminists during the conflict 
and the movement sought to ensure that gender equality would feature as a key part of 
any future consociational structure.  
 The feminist movement broadly consolidated under the Northern Ireland 
Women’s Coalition (NIWC), a non-sectarian movement formed in 1996 to represent 
women in peace talks. To foster inclusivity, representation at the talks was based on 
results from an election that offered participation on relatively few votes. In the 1996 
elections NIWC secured two seats in the peace negotiations, where its delegates had 
the status of full members. The NIWC advanced the discourse of human rights, parity 
of esteem and minority rights, which became central tenets of the peace process, and 
also advanced gender equality. NIWC challenged the assumption that rights should be 
restricted to the main ethnonational groups by putting gender politics on the political 
map for the first time and forcing its competitors to address its platform. NIWC 
managed to insert gender into the 1998 consociational Agreement, which commits the 
signatories to “affirm in particular … the right of women to full and equal political 
participation” 27  and the political parties pledged their commitment to the 
“advancement of women in public life.”28 
 Northern Ireland’s self-determined consociational format presents some 
prospects for the inclusion of non-sectarian parties. Seizing these opportunities, the 
NIWC won two seats in the Northern Ireland Assembly, the power-sharing 
parliament, including one representative as the Deputy Speaker of the chamber. 
Beyond gender equality, within the power-sharing Assembly the NIWC promoted 
issues such as health and education in a way that transcended ethnopolitical 
contestation. 
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 Although Northern Ireland’s consociational institutions initially allowed 
access for the NIWC, the longer-term effects of these power-sharing structures on the 
progress of gender equality require analysis. Yet, despite such pledges, in certain 
respects the post-Agreement period has seen a regression of women’s rights and 
interests. This can be see in one sense in the squeezing out of the Women’s Coalition 
in a post-GFA era which witnessed the hardline parties becoming dominant within the 
respective ethnonational blocs. In this environment of ethnic outbidding, the NIWC 
lost both of its seats in the 2003 Assembly election, obtaining only 0.8 per cent of the 
vote, a 50 per cent drop from its 1998 performance. After losing its remaining 
political representatives in local elections, the party wound up in 2006.  In addition, 
the post-GFA period have seen a notable increase in domestic violence. 29  The 
situation is equally problematic for reproductive rights. Abortion rights remain limited 
in Northern Ireland compared to the rest of the UK. Abortion in Northern Ireland is 
permissible only in circumstances where a women life is at risk or there is a risk of 
permanent or serious damage to her mental or physical health.  
 It is significant that the main ethnonationalist parties in the power-sharing 
government are broadly in agreement on in their opposition to the liberalisation of 
female reproductive rights in Northern Ireland. In the context of consociational 
power-sharing since 1998, all attempts to reform abortion laws have been rejected 
since there are only small differences of policy on this issue between the main 
ethnonationalist parties. While Sinn Fein, the main nationalist party, support abortion 
reform only in the case of rape, or sexual crime or when a pregnant women’s life is in 
danger, the option of termination should be available, the DUP oppose all reform. For 
instance, a proposal to extend the Abortion Act 1967 to Northern Ireland – thereby 
bringing it into line with the rest of the UK – was defeated by 59 votes to 40 in the 
Commented [JN1]: (Jarman, 2004; Galligan, 2013; Horgan and 
O’Connor, 2014). For example, in 2015/2016, there were 28,392 
domestic incidents and 14,073 domestic abuse crimes recorded by the 
Police Service of Northern Ireland, the highest levels recorded since 
the data series began in 2004/2005 (PSNI, 2016: 6). 
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Assembly.30 Thus, while divided societies are often seen as endowed with permeative 
properties in the sense that all issues become a focus for intergroup division and 
conflict – a situation often enhanced in consociational systems, reproductive rights 
provides some degree of cross-cleavage consensus.  
 
Sexual minorities 
The liberal format of the Northern Ireland Agreement grants limited recognition of 
sexual difference, particularly section (75) on “Human Rights.”31 In consequence, 
public authorities are legally obliged to promote good practice for sexual minority 
groups, including involving them in consultation processes. In consequence, sexual 
minorities in Northern Ireland are now officially designated as stakeholders in social 
and political initiatives. Despite these protections, homophobic attacks and sentiment 
have increased since the signing of the 1998 Agreement.32 In 2013, there were 246 
homophobic incidences reported to the Police Service in Northern Ireland (PSNI), the 
highest number of incidents recorded, and 149 homophobic crimes, an increase from 
the previous peak.33  
 Although homophobic sentiment and violence cannot be directly attributed to 
power-sharing, LGBTQ rights have become a fundamental area of conflict between 
nationalists and unionists. As noted earlier, post-Agreement politics in Northern 
Ireland underwent a process of ethnic outbidding that resulted in the electoral 
victories of the hardline parties of the respective ethnonationalist blocs – Sinn Féin 
and the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP). While there is some evidence that these 
parties have moderated their ethnic politics in power, LGBTQ rights increasingly 
represents a core dividing lines between nationalists and unionists. Sinn Féin, the 
leading Irish nationalist party, supports sexual minority rights, by conflating their 
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struggle as a minority movement with the experience of the LGBTQ population. 
“Moving On,” Sinn Féin’s “Policy for Lesbian, Gay and Bi-Sexual Equality,” states: 
…”[nationalists] are only too well aware of what it means to be treated as second-
class citizens. Our politics are the results of decades of resistance to marginalisation 
and discrimination.”34  The DUP, alternatively, articulate unwavering opposition to 
LGBTQ rights. 
 These contrasting positions on LGBTQ rights generate conflict within power-
sharing institutions, particularly on same-sex marriage legislation. Since 2013 Sinn 
Féin, in conjunction with other parties, have tabled five motions on same sex-
marriage legislation for the power-sharing parliament to vote on. On each occasion, 
the DUP deployed a petition of concern, which means that a motion can only pass if a 
majority of nationalists and unionists support it. In so doing, the DUP exercised their 
communal veto to block legislation designed to advance equality for a non-
ethnonational grouping – sexual minorities. A marked ethnonational cleavage is also 
apparent in the voting habits of the 108 representatives of the Northern Ireland 
Assembly on same-sex marriage legislation. In a vote in April 2014, all nationalist 
representatives who voted did so in support; all but four unionists declared opposition.  
 These elite level divisions are mirrored in public attitudes. An analysis of 
public opinions on a range of same-sex issues reveals that attitudes towards equality 
rights for gay and lesbian people account for divergent views between unionists and 
nationalists. For individuals who define themselves as unionist, 61 per cent rejected 
same-sex marriage as invalid, while 30 per cent of individuals who define themselves 
as Irish nationalist reject the validity of same sex marriage. A similar figure marks 
attitudes towards the teaching of gay and lesbian rights in schools.35  
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 In accounting for differences between nationalists and unionists on LGBTQ 
rights, a significant factor concerns how the two groups have conceived and deployed 
the human rights discourse that undergirds Northern Ireland’s liberal power-sharing. 
Nationalists and unionists have clashed acrimoniously over how rights should be 
allocated and, as a consequence, LGBTQ rights are now entangled within the wider 
struggle for ethnonational rights in post-Agreement Northern Ireland. Indeed, 
minority and group rights quickly became an arena of conflict between Irish 
nationalists and UK unionists. For nationalists, the smaller ethnonationalist group, 
minority rights were framed the “equality agenda,” a process of redressing former 
imbalances regarding the accommodation of nationalist identity. 36  For unionists, 
alternatively, the equality agenda represents a nationalist strategy to restrict unionist 
symbols and culture. In this scenario, Irish nationalist parties support LGBTQ rights 
because it reinforces the equality agenda and minority rights. Unionist parties resist 
LGBTQ rights as a Trojan horse deployed by nationalists to attack unionist identity. 
Thus, in post-Agreement Northern Ireland the difference in support for LGBTQ rights 
between the two main communities – Unionist and Nationalist – has now become an 
example of human rights becoming war by other means. The DUP’s use of the veto is 
particularly instructive in revealing how liberal consociations may inadvertently 
impact on non-ethnic groups, including sexual minorities. As noted by McCulloch, 
Northern Ireland’s liberal consociationalism has a “permissive” veto system which 
provides a high degree of latitude for the ethnonational groups to self-identify and 
articulate their own vital interests.37 This means that groups can use their veto to stop 
policies that are not clearly a threat to their communities’ interests, such as same-sex 
marriage. 
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 The embroilment of LGBTQ rights within the broader contestation for group 
rights highlights the complex dynamics of liberal power-sharing and its consequences 
for sexual minorities.  It not only illuminates how the rights demands of groups that 
are not officially accommodated within power-sharing structures can become an arena 
of conflict between the main ethnic groups, but also the limits of seeing 
ethnonationalism as uniformly homophobic. Thus, in Northern Ireland, the sharp 
cleavage between nationalists and unionists over LGBTQ rights demonstrate that 
ethnonationalist groups can co-opt LGBTQ rights claims when such demands align 
with their political interests. 
 
Lebanon: Women and Sexual Minorities 
Women 
In 2012 Lebanon’s Parliamentary Human Rights Committee adopted a National 
Human Rights Plan for the most vulnerable, and named improving women’s rights as 
one of its key priorities. 38 The committee recognized the importance of rooting out 
forms of discrimination against women and unequivocally acknowledged that their 
status in Lebanon is vulnerable. Indeed, while women’s movements are pivotal, the 
state’s governance mode is unfavorable to gender equality in general and to women’s 
political representation in particular. 39 
The roots of inequality and underrepresentation can be primarily ascribed to 
Lebanon’s politics of sectarianism, subsumed under the field of corporate 
consociationalism. The corporate system ensures the control of sectarian leaders over 
their constituencies and allocates executive posts and seats in the parliament in 
accordance with rigid sectarian criteria. By privileging sectarian communities as the 
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building blocks of political life, it constrains opportunities for the representation of 
other societal groups, particularly women, youths and sexual minorities. 40 
  There is a prevailing consensus in the literature that discriminatory laws in the 
personal status codes – such as those pertaining to marriage, nationality, adultery and 
divorce – are key to understanding women’s societal subordination and political 
underrepresentation in Lebanon. 41  Such laws have been particularly decried for 
favoring a patriarchal social construct in which the state envisions women as part of a 
“social unit headed by a male relative.”42 Some grassroots activists posit that these 
laws, in which “women can only exist in the registry as daughters of men or wives of 
men” are the root causes for women’s marginalization and thwarted political 
agency.43  Once married, for instance, Lebanese women can only vote or run for 
elections in the locality where their spouse was born.  
 In addition, the survival of Lebanon’s consociational model is contingent on 
certain prerequisites, such as the maintenance of sectarian balance through specified 
fixed quotas and the religious communities’ autonomy over their affairs, two factors 
that have hindered the principle of equality between men and women. A case in point 
is the nationality law, according to which Lebanese women are unable to transmit 
their nationality to their children or spouse. Policymakers have so far blocked reform 
initiatives on the grounds that allowing women to pass on their nationality could tip 
Lebanon’s sectarian balance, 44   challenging Lebanon’s power-sharing which 
safeguards intercommunal coexistence through predetermined arrangements. The 
principle of segmental autonomy, which delegates power to religious authorities in 
personal status matters, also leads to the entrenchment of women’s vulnerability 
status. 45  This principle has made legislative reforms such as the optional civil 
marriage law contingent on religious authorities’ discretion. 46 
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     An inquiry into Lebanon’s transition from war to peace (1990 onwards) is key to 
understanding how Lebanon’s governance mode has restricted opportunities for 
women’s empowerment.  Postwar political and economic processes have largely 
ignored the issue of women’s representation and role in participative governance. In 
1989, the Ta’if Agreement, which reformed Lebanon’s consociational model, was 
mainly concerned with improving the representation of sects in the legislature and 
executive. It remained silent on gender sensitive reforms. Moreover, the post-2006 
National Dialogue, an informal platform set up to process Lebanon’s domestic 
conflicts, groups together sixteen confessional leaders, none of whom is a woman. 
While women have, over the past few years, acquired more prominent positions in 
municipal councils and in the youth wings and political bureaus of political parties,47 
they continue to be underrepresented in political institutions. Notably, women 
currently hold only three percent of parliamentary seats. 48 
 Women’s underrepresentation in politics aside, the post-war state has not 
promoted their role in economic development either. Though the ratio of gross 
enrollment in education is slightly higher for women, 49 the economy has failed to 
create enough jobs for them. 50 Female participation in the labour market amounts 
only to 23.3 percent. 51 Moreover, Lebanon’s political model constrains opportunities 
for women’s representation not only because it privileges sectarian representation and 
couples political sectarianism with family law 52 but also because of its propensity to 
generate gridlock and fractured political coalitions.  As a result of systemic deadlocks 
and power struggles, women’s issues have ranked low in national agenda setting. 
Though various electoral reform initiatives such as the 2006 National Commission for 
Electoral Law Reform (NCLER) have stressed the importance of introducing a 
women’s electoral quota, squabbling among Lebanon’s contending coalitions have 
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hampered any progress on this front. In the context of the 2008 Sunni-Shia 
confrontation, the parliament hurried to adopt a new electoral law in the run up to the 
2009 elections, dismissing alternative initiatives for electoral systems which included 
a women’s quota. 
 The polity’s embroilment in regional conflicts has also thwarted reform 
initiatives and slowed down legislative activities, overshadowing the issues of gender 
equality. In 2006, the Nationality Campaign was interrupted by the July War between 
Hezbollah and Israel. 53  Further exacerbating the situation, since 2011, Lebanon 
incurred heavy spillovers from Syria’s conflict. Priority issues such as security 
governance and strains resulting from the Syrian refugee influx have dominated 
policy debates, and sectarian elites have seized on these issues to argue that any 
change to the power-sharing system would threaten the state’s survival. Privileging 
crisis-driven politics in the shadow of Syria’s lethal conflict, the political elite have 
neglected issues that are not linked to the representation of sects or to security.54  
           In this context, gender inequalities have spurred vociferous debates in 
Lebanon’s public sphere. Women’s claims-making are central to the postwar politics 
of activism, and grassroots groups have incorporated the issue of gender equality in 
their advocacy and programming. Women civic society organizations (CSOs) have 
continuously lobbied governments to implement legal reforms.55 They have had some 
success, in particular with the passage of the 2011 law eliminating mitigating 
circumstances in the context of honor crimes and the 2014 Domestic Violence law. 
         Though women have been underrepresented in the government, grassroots 
groups demanding gender justice and a reformulation of the concept of citizenship 
represent key actors in Lebanon’s protest events, namely the 2010 Laique pride, the 
2011 anti-sectarian demonstrations, and the 2015 You Stink Movement. 56 Still, while 
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women’s grassroots organizations participate in major episodes of contention, rare are 
protests which revolve around issues specific to gender.57  Rallying around women-
linked grievances has been particularly challenging in the context of sectarian 
politics.58  
Furthermore, women’s activism suffers from an ideological rift that weakens 
the consensus needed to formulate strategies to effect change. At the heart of this rift 
lies the dilemma of whether to cooperate or not with the sectarian system. While some 
organizations such as the National Commission for Lebanese women (NCLW) have 
cooperated with Lebanon’s ministries on a gradualist path of reform, grassroots 
activist groups perceive a potential “coalescence with the system” as self-defeating.59  
 
Sexual minorities 
The plight of LGBTQ communities within Lebanon’s model of corporate 
consociationalism is fraught with difficulty. Conceived as a political strategy that 
gives “existing” sectarian cleavages “binding force”60 through fixed quotas, the model 
undermines the expression of alternative sociocultural cleavages, making it 
excessively difficult for LGBTQ groups to voice divergent demands. Furthermore, the 
politics of sectarianism, which uphold a patriarchal conception of society and family 
life, nurtures adversarial feelings toward sexual minorities.  
 Unlike the issue of women’s representation which elicits attention in policy 
debates, LGBTQ concerns are completely elided on the policy agenda. The Lebanese 
law does not overtly discriminate against individuals on the basis of gender or 
sexuality. Yet, Article 534 of the penal code, which forbids “sexual intercourse 
contrary to the order of nature,” has justified the prosecution and stigmatization of 
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LGBTQ communities.61 Human Rights Watch reports chastize Lebanon’s security 
and police forces for excessively mistreating suspected homosexuals.62 
  Despite Lebanon’s constraining setting, LGBTQ communities articulate a 
politics of claim-making through advocating for their rights and rallying for 
abolishing political sectarianism.  In recent years, some developments have 
encouraged LGBTQ and LGBTQ-friendly grassroots communities to challenge 
stereotypes against homophobia and homosexuality and to advocate for the abolition 
of article 534. Several court rulings have refused in the last years to criminalize 
individuals charged under Article 534.63 Moreover, in 2013, the Lebanese Psychiatric 
Society ruled that homosexuality is not a mental disorder. Against this backdrop, 
grassroots organizations and academic spheres increasingly raise awareness about the 
rights of sexual minorities through workshops, legal activist channels, and 
publications.64 
  Just like women’s grassroots activists, LGBTQ groups have participated in 
key protests pressing for alternative conceptions of citizenship in Lebanon. An iconic 
protest was the 2010 Laique Pride, in which LGBTQ groups such as Helem brought 
forward their claims and openly discussed the uneasy relationship between 
sectarianism and LGBTQ rights.65 Though sexual minorities may differ on the means 
of mobilization, they tend to agree that eradicating the politics of sectarianism and 
patriarchal societal constructs is a precondition to expanding their rights. The goal 
here is to decouple citizenship and lawmaking from the grip of religious authorities.  
  Even though LGBTQ communities have so far relied on extra-institutional 
channels to voice their grievances, the path of contentious politics remains complex. 
LGBTQ groups have not been able to carve out their own space of contention. Protest 
framings that restrict themselves to LGBTQ rights and homophobia have not gained 
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much resonance with the broader Lebanese public. At the same time, anti-sectarian 
protests lumping together various grievances overshadow their specific claims. In this 
context, one of their dilemmas is whether to talk about LGBTQ rights in anti-
sectarian protests or merely to endorse the latter without bringing in their own specific 
grievances.66 Though protests decrying Lebanon’s political system resonate with the 
LGBTQ activists’ goal-oriented actions, such episodes bring together a spectrum of 
fragmented movements, making it difficult to forge an identity for queer politics. 
Adding to this, divisions over mobilization tactics among sexual minorities hamper 
the solidification of a shared space of contention. Lesbian, gay and transsexual 
communities voice heterogeneous grievances within Lebanon’s patriarchal construct. 
Moreover, while some groupings advocate for legal reforms, others argue that only a 
secular system in which politics is delinked from sectarianism could serve their cause. 
Some activists debate furthermore whether it would be more advantageous for 
Lesbians to position their grievances within women’s movements rather than within 
sexual minorities’ repertoire and tactics of contention. 67 
  In general, the deeply-seated entwining between political sectarianism and 
patriarchy makes the empowerment of sexual minorities a task worthy of Sisyphus, 
contingent on an overhaul of laws and political structures.  Though civic spheres and 
international organizations have embarked on a myriad of citizenship projects, the 
latter have so far not had any impact on the political system. Lebanon’s sectarian 
gatekeepers are deeply reluctant to ‘deconfessionalizing’ the system, as this would 
mean relinquishing their own power. 68  Moreover, Lebanon’s corporate 
consociationalism, which couples political accommodation and state survival with the 
preservation of sectarianism, arises as a structural impediment to the expression of 
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non-sectarian identities and to their inclusion in the policy agenda, especially in times 
of crisis-driven politics.  
 
Conclusion 
Consociationalism is now one of the principal tools used to foster peace, applied or 
suggested as fit by the international community for Bosnia, Lebanon, Northern 
Ireland, Afghanistan, Burundi, Syria and Iraq. A small body of researchers has turned 
their gaze towards the consequences of power-sharing for identity groups not formally 
specified in such pacts, particularly its effects on gender equality. In this paper, we 
seek to expand this ongoing project by adding sexual minorities, alongside women, to 
the analysis of consociationalism’s effects. We argue that in order to fully understand 
these dynamics it is important to take into account variations in power-sharing 
arrangements. In particular, scholars and policymakers distinguish between two types 
of consociational structures – liberal and corporate – which expedite markedly 
contrasting effects depending on the degree to which they institutionalize ethnicity 
and permit or prohibit rights for non-sectarian groups. While liberal systems appear 
advantageous compared to corporate ones by initially encouraging access for non-
sectarian groups, in the long-term they can generate more negative dynamics as the 
institutions seek to maintain stability by strengthening the adversarial ethnic groups. 
Corporate systems, alternatively, by aiming to freeze the balance of power between 
the ethnic groups, completely exclude non-ethnic groups and rights and are even used 
by ethnic hardliners to deem non-sectarian groups as a threat to the integrity of 
power-sharing and thus as a threat to peace and security. These distinctions also shape 
differences in non-sectarian rights activism. Non-sectarian movements in liberal 
systems mobilize for inclusion within the system but can become easily sidelined in a 
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framework infected by ethnic outbidding. In corporate frameworks, however, gender 
based and sexual minority movements tend to see the sectarian system as profoundly 
patriarchal and heteronormative, and thus as a site of radical opposition than as a 
framework through which rights can be sought and achieved. 
 In examining the Northern Irish and Lebanese case-studies we have 
illuminated some of the dynamics generated respectively by liberal and corporate 
forms. This is not to ignore the role that religious and various other cultural cross 
pressures may have in shaping differences between the two cases in relation to 
restrictions regarding gender equality and sexual rights. A further area of future 
research – which space permits us from pursuing here – is to consider whether 
consociational arrangements create contrasting consequences for gender equality and 
LGBTQ rights. In short, greater scholarly attention is required to understand and even 
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